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China, Economische Wondere Wereldmacht

1. [verwijderd] 16 februari 2005 15:04

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   The mobile industry typically thinks of India and China in terms of opportunity -- but the reality is that they are an increasing threat as well.
   
   With a combined population of up to 3 billion and rapid predicted growth in mobile usage, much of the talk at 3GSM is about the opportunity in India and China. Yes, vendors realize that they are facing increasingly fierce domestic competitors in the two markets. Take the Chinese handset market, where the domestic vendors now claim over 50% of the market. But the threat that is usually ignored is Chinese and Indian vendors entering European and US markets.
   
   The Politics and Background
   
   One of the false assumptions made by many Western commentators is that Chinese and Indian vendors do not need to export, given their huge and often untapped domestic markets. Of course, another is that they do not have the skills or expertise to compete against Western vendors -- something the 80,000-plus software developers that graudate each year or the more than 3 million Java developers in India proves simply isn't true. There are four main reasons why the Indian and Chinese vendors are looking to export.
   
   One, government initiatives exist in both countries to create global players. As is widely known, both China and India have clear long-term IT growth plans. In China, the Ministry of Information Industry is typically looking at least five years ahead, and up to 15 years. Equally, in India, groups such as Nasscom (the National Association for Software and Services Companies) have typically ten-year horizons. A key aim in both countries is to create global titans.
   
   Two, they are using the expertise created in the country, partly by the joint ventures with Western vendors, to create export opportunities. In China, this is known as the "inside-out" strategy: building up a strong domestic player and then moving into international markets. These domestic players have already become strong, as shown by their ability to lead joint ventures -- such as Chinese handset vendor TCL taking a 55% stake in its JV with Alcatel -- or make huge acquisitions, such as Lenovo's purchase of the PC-making arm of IBM for $1.25 billion.
   
   Three, they are looking to escape increasingly intense domestic competition. It is not just Western vendors who have faced margin and market share pressure, particularly in China, over the last several years. Domestic vendors also want to grow and diversify.
   
   Four, the Chinese and Indian vendors see demand from international markets. It is falsely assumed this is always at the low-end and low-cost part of the market, although this is sometimes a starting point. Sometimes it is in similar markets, which are either at comparable stages of development or are close geographically and culturally. In other areas, it can be where the vendors see they could be potential global leaders.
   
   China's Infrastructure Vendors
   
   Moving from the general to the specific, let's take a look at three of China's largest infrastructure players. Huawei, UTStarcom and ZTE earned around 1% of their revenues outside China in 2000; in 2004, the figure is expected to be around 33%.
   Chinese researchers Norson Consulting expect this proportion to rise to 70% for Huawei, and 80% for both UTStarcom and ZTE by 2008. The majority of international sales for Huawei and ZTE are in mobile infrastructure.
   
   The Chinese vendors have typically approached price-conscious markets where their domestic experience is helpful, particularly other emerging markets like parts of Asia, Eastern Europe and the Middle East.
   
   Another good example is Africa, where ZTE has sold fixed and/or mobile infrastructure to more than 14 countries. It is a fallacy, too, to think it is only older technology that the Chinese vendors are selling. For example, in September, ZTE sold the first 3G network in Tunisia for commercial launch in 2005. Huawei has just sold a package to Hong Kong mobile operator Sunday that includes all 3G elements, including core and wireless access networks, mobile intelligent network, data service platform and applications.
   
   This latter deal is also interesting for two other reasons. First, the terms of the deal imply something like 150% financing. This may have been helped by the Chinese government policy of providing favorable loans to the vendors it sees as potential global players. Second, the desire from Huawei to get a strong "international" reference customer, taking Sunday away from Nortel.
   
   Chinese Handset Vendors and Applications
   
   From Western vendors dominating the Chinese handset market, domestic vendors now claim over 50% (although this figure is hard to assess). What is clear is that the local vendors have used their domestic knowledge to fight back -- for example, Ningbo Bird by targeting smaller towns and cities, and DBTel competing on price.
   
   Chinese vendor TCL has already joined the major leagues by forming a joint venture with Alcatel. Formed in August 2004, TCL & Alcatel Mobile Phones (TAMP) is 55% owned by TCL, with Alcatel owning the remaining 45%. Other major Western vendors such as Siemens have also partnered with Chinese vendors to reduce their exposure to the market.
   
   A different approach is being taken by Ningbo Bird, which had total handset sales of around 15 million in 2004, with 3 million outside China. In 2003, it established Bird International in Hong Kong, and grew international sales by 500% in 2004 and has plans to sell 20 million handsets outside China a year by 2006. Its key differentiators have been cost and innovative designs.
   
   Luckily for Western mobile application developers, the Chinese market has tended to focus inwards or on other markets using Mandarin. However, the Chinese applications market is huge and innovative. China Mobile and Unicom copied the NTT DoCoMo model by deploying mobile data service platforms like Monternet and UniInfo, respectively. Both operators collect roughly 15% of all mobile data revenue as a flat fee and an additional 5% to 7% as transmission fees, with all remaining revenue going to Chinese WASPs. Although the Chinese WASPs have recently suffered from a crackdown on their content, the market at the developer level is still thriving. Vodafone is rumored to be moving its own development work into China (and India) to take advantage of this base. It is likely that several Chinese application vendors will emerge as global players over the next few years.
   
   India
   
   India has been behind China in many areas of mobile development and creating global mobile players. One of the signs of its future emergence is all the Western money set to enter the country in 2005 with Nokia, currently the leading handset provider to the country, at the forefront.
   
   There are three specific areas in which Indian vendors are likely to become international and global players. The first is the development of mobile applications and software by Indian software and outsourcing titans such as Wipro, Satyam and Infosys. These companies already have a global presence and will use demand in India as a basis for international expansion.
   
   The second is in specific mobile applications areas where Indian companies believe they an edge. Two examples are gaming and mobile Linux. Vendors on the gaming side include Dhruva Interactive, IndiaGames Ltd, Itfinity and Paradox Studios. IndiaGames was behind a globally released game based on the Hollywood movie Spiderman, and Dhruva has a license
2. [verwijderd] 17 februari 2005 11:52

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   quote:

   greenspeak schreef:

   Artist,
   
   zeit gij ge-lieerd aan een of andere bank of zo? Ge zeit erg pro Cina en Hong Kong. Nu ben ik zelf ook ge-interesseerd in de economische ontwikkelen in zowel China als Hong Kong. PETROCHINA (HKSE:0857.HK)en CHINA RES POWER (HKSE:0836.HK). Ondanks de recente slowdown doen deze twee fondsen het nog heel goed
   
   Heeft U nog enige andere fondsen om in de gaten te houden voor toekomstige beleggingen?
   
   bij voorbaat mijn dank,
   
   peter greenspeak
   

   Ben bijde aandelen juist gaan checken en ik vind dat het er zeer goed uit ziet.
   
   Net zoals Petrochina raadt ik ook andere chinese fondsen aan zoals CNOOC of SINOPEC CORP.
   
   U vind deze ook bij het "Red-Chips"-draadje.
   
   The Artist
   
   ps: ik reageer hier wel op een bericht van vorig jaar.
   ( greenspeak - 2-8-04, 22:32 )
3. [verwijderd] 28 februari 2005 19:08

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   Gene kattepis
   
   HSBC unveils record annual profits
   By Gordon Smith in London
   Published: February 28 2005 09:53 | Last updated: February 28 2005 14:30
   
   HSBC, the world’s second largest bank, on Monday reported record full-year profits and highlighted the importance of China as an emerging economic power.
   
   Benign credit conditions in Europe and the US and high levels of employment helped HSBC lift pre-tax profits to the end of 2004 by 37 per cent, compared to the previous year, to $17.61bn. Analysts had pencilled in a total between $16.7bn and $18.5bn. Revenues increased by 23 per cent to $50.59bn.
   
   
4. [verwijderd] 17 maart 2005 13:39

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   Thursday March 17, 05:24 PM
   
   Analysis - Business In China, The Next Stage - March 2005
   
   (Analysis by Deloitte Research. Contact details below.)
   
   BEIJING, March 17 Asia Pulse - The role of Chinese companies is changing. Although China's export growth has been driven by foreign and foreign-invested companies, some domestic companies in China are beginning to emerge as serious competitors to global brands.
   
   
   
   Perhaps the best examples are Haier, manufacturer of white goods, and Lenovo, manufacturer of computers. These partially privatized companies began by developing the domestic market but are now starting to export in large quantities.
   Today, Haier has over 40 per cent of the U.S. market for small refrigerators and wine coolers and even manufactures in the United States as well as in other countries.
   For developed country retailers, these up-and-coming Chinese suppliers are starting to provide the basis for new, cheaper, exclusive-label merchandise.
   In the future, this will become a much bigger issue as China's domestic market becomes liberalized. The key will be the future of the Chinese banking system.
   The reason is that, heretofore, Chinese companies have been able to survive for years while losing money because they can cover their losses by borrowing from state banks.
   Thus, they had little incentive to be efficient or profitable. When the banking system becomes fully resolved, this avenue to survival will disappear, forcing Chinese companies to become profitable or die.
   Those that are already profitable are demonstrating the potential. With banking reform, many more will be forced to become efficient and, ultimately, worldclass.
   The situation in China, therefore, is somewhat reminiscent of Japan in the 1950s or Korea in the 1970s.
   Those were the times when local companies started to become internationally competitive, producing cheap goods for export. This ultimately resulted in such global brand names as Toyota and Samsung.
   In addition, with entry into the World Trade Organization (WTO), China will be required to remove many discriminatory rules that protect local producers from foreign competition.
   More competition will help many Chinese companies to emerge as strong, world-class players especially if they gain access to global capital and credit markets.
   The latter will come about when foreign banks fully participate in the Chinese economysomething that is required under WTO rules.
   Already, some Chinese companies are becoming global players. Consider Lenovo, China's largest maker of personal computers, which recently acquired IBM's personal computer business.
   Lenovo controls about a third (27 per cent) of China's PC market, but faces increasing competition from the likes of Dell, Hewlett Packard, and others. Yet Lenovo is now well positioned to be a global player in an increasingly commoditized market in which price is critical.
   A bigger exporter is Haier, China's largest producer of consumer products. Approximately 15 per cent of Haier's revenue is generated outside China.
   Haier is best known as a branded producer of white goods and some electronics such as color televisions. Haier has 6 per cent of the global market for refrigerators and 5.8 percent of the global market for washing machines.
   The company sells its products in 160 countries and has relationships with such retail giants as Wal-Mart, Home Depot, and Sears.
   Aside from selling Haier-branded products, the company also performs outsourced manufacturing.
   For example, Haier manufactures home freezers for Japanese producer Sanyo for sale in Japan under the Sanyo label.
   Due to its low prices and increasing brand awareness, Haier poses the same kind of challenge to Japanese and Korean producers as those producers did to U.S. suppliers a generation ago.
   Indeed, Haier already has a refrigeration factory in South Carolina in order to be closer to the ultimate U.S. consumer.
   BRIGHT FUTURE
   The future for Chinese companies looks bright for a number of reasons: First, Chinese companies already have a substantial and growing share of the lucrative Chinese market. Thus they are developing the critical mass necessary to compete in a global arena. Second, they are improving their technical prowess, increasingly participating in high-tech markets such as personal computers and mobile phones. For example, Chinese companies now have 44 per cent of the Chinese mobile phone market, the world's largest with 70 million units sold in 2004.
   Third, Chinese companies are piggybacking on the technology developed by U.S. and Japanese companies. They spend a far lower share of revenue on research and thus have a cost advantage over the world's leaders.
   On the other hand, Chinese companies have some disadvantages: First, they face increasing protectionist pressures in the United States and Europe. For example, the U.S. government is currently suing a group of Chinese television producers under anti-dumping statutes. Interestingly, Wal-Mart and Sears have filed briefs on behalf of the defendants. There is a strong possibility that duties of 84 per cent will be imposed on Chinese television imports.
   Second, despite their low costs, Chinese companies are not yet known for the same quality as Western producers, often involving much higher defect rates.
   Third, the increasing output of China's electronics producers is contributing to global excess capacity, thereby putting downward pressure on prices and margins.
   Finally, Chinese companies are not investing sufficiently in research and thus cannot expect to reap the higher margins that accrue to innovators. They remain commodity producers.
   Recently, Deloitte and the Economist Intelligence Unit conducted a survey of Chinese business executives in order to understand the issues and challenges that concern them most.
   Based on our survey, we learned that in the coming years, Chinese executives intend to focus much of their attention on the following three issues: Branding and marketing, Corporate governance, Human resource management.
   When paired with greater access to world markets afforded to these companies by China's WTO accession, this becomes a very formidable strategy for competing beyond China.
   The world is already becoming familiar with some of the best practitioners of these strategies to achieve world-class status - Haier, Tsingtao, TCL, and now Lenovo, to name a few. There can be little doubt that we will soon learn of others (Shanghai Automotive, Huawei Technologies, Ningbo Bird, Little Swan).
   What we are observing is the birth of the next generation of global multinationals.
   BRANDING AND MARKETING
   Many global brands in China may no longer possess the cachet they once had now that national brands have come of age. This is similar to the experience of other emerging markets where local brands gained strength and skillfully exploited nostalgia, cultural affinity, or even national pride. In response, foreign brands adjust by tailoring their wares to local markets (KFC offering herbal teas in China, Crest introducing jasmine flavored toothpaste) and/or incorporating more culturally specific market approaches (getting product endorsements from local celebrities). They seek to become more Chinese even as some Chinese companies are busy re-branding to go global. Foreign companies are becoming more innovative in marketing as well.
   For example, in addition to being an official co-sponsor of th
5. [verwijderd] 17 maart 2005 13:41

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   For example, in addition to being an official co-sponsor of the 2008 Olympics, Eastman Kodak has responded to the highly competitive camera market in eastern China by setting up a second headquarters in Chongqing, 1,000 miles up the Yangtze River from Shanghai, and engaging in "camera seeding" -- donating thousands of free cameras in places like remote Gansu to encourage market growth.
   Kodak's approach has the added benefit of dovetailing with central government policy priorities - in this case the "Go West" campaign to develop the 11 western provinces.
   Another example is Volkswagen, which has seen its market share erode in the face of increased foreign and domestic competition.
   This past summer, it launched a major China-specific ad campaign `China's Journey, Volkswagen's Heart' recognizing the need to tailor its `For the love of automobiles' campaign to better suit local sentiment.
   As for Chinese brands, despite their huge domestic market many are still small, weak, and relatively unsophisticated by global standards.
   According to a study by Access Asia, the five most valuable brands in China in 2002 were Haier (home appliances), Hongtashan (cigarettes), Changhong (home appliances), Wuliangye (liquor), and Lenovo (computers).
   These companies had a combined turnover of less than US$5 billion. By comparison, all 500 brands included on the most recent Fortune 500 list of global brand values each have annual turnovers in excess of US$10 billion.
   Moreover, China's leading companies mostly compete on the basis of price and usually have overlapping distribution strategies. When it comes to technology products, most Chinese brands are based on licenses from global companies rather than innovative technology. Thus, there is not much product differentiation.
   
   SOURCE: Deloitte Research (Excerpt reprinted with permission)
   
   TITLE: Business in China, the Next Stage: The Fifth Modernization (White Paper, published Jan 2005)
   
   WEBSITE: www.deloitte.com/dtt/cda/doc/content/...
   
   ASIA PULSE
   
   
6. [verwijderd] 17 maart 2005 13:45

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   Ik kan er weinig aan doen dat de beste teksten nog steeds in het Engels zijn, een aanrader is de weblink =>
   
   WEBSITE: www.deloitte.com/dtt/cda/doc/content/...
7. [verwijderd] 20 maart 2005 16:41

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   Petrochina is voorlopig het raket aandeel voor de komende maanden samen met Lenovo.
   
   The Artist & Sarah
8. [verwijderd] 22 maart 2005 00:02

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   english.sina.com/business/p/1/2005/03...
9. [verwijderd] 22 maart 2005 19:04

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   quote:

   The artist schreef:

   english.sina.com/business/p/1/2005/03...
   

   Engels of niet => Lezen
   
   The Artist
   
10. [verwijderd] 22 maart 2005 23:19

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    quote:

    The artist schreef:

    Petrochina is voorlopig het raket aandeel voor de komende maanden samen met Lenovo.
    
    The Artist & Sarah
    

    Op de vraag waarom hij in een Chinees oliebedrijf investeert, antwoordt Buffett dat dit bedrijf gelijkaardig is aan de grote oliebedrijven in de wereld. Petrochina is het 4e meest winstgevende oliebedrijf ter wereld en produceert ongeveer dezelfde hoeveelheid ruwe olie als Exxon. Het is geen ingewikkeld bedrijf, het is gewoon een groot oliebedrijf en de activiteit is eenvoudig te snappen.
    
    Bovendien vertelt het jaarverslag meer dan andere grote oliebedrijven, bijvoorbeeld dat ze 45% van de winst als dividend uitkeren.
    
    “I like knowing that that cash will come to Berkshire.”
    
    Berkshire Hathaway kocht het belang in Petrochina omdat het zeer goedkoop was, zelfs beterkoop dan Exxon, BP of Shell. Ook al is 90% van het bedrijf in handen van de Chinese overheid, toch blijft Buffett erbij dat het een goede investering is.
    
    “There’s Yukos, the big oil company in Russia. In evaluating country risk, you can reach your own judgments. In our view, PetroChina had less risk.”
11. [verwijderd] 24 maart 2005 22:36

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    Comgest Growth Greater China Acc
    
    heb dit fondske gevonden en dit presteerd beter als de Red Chips.
    ( voorlopig )
    
    spijtig genoeg ken ik Comgest niet.
    
    The Artist
    
    Top 5 posities %
    
    CLP Hldgs Ltd 4.7
    CHINA OILFIELD SERVI... 4.6
    Taiwan Secom 4.4
    Cafe de Coral Hldgs Ltd 4.1
    Datang Intl Pwr Gene... 3.9
    
    Rendementen %
    EUR
    1-Dag 0.1
    1-week 0.7
    1-Maand 0.7
    6-Maand 1.3
    1-Jaar 0.5
    3-Jaar geannualiseerd 13.6
    
    
    Beleggingsdoelstelling
    The investment objective of the Comgest Growth Greater China fund is to create a professionally managed portfolio consisting primarily of what, in the opinion of the Investment Adviser, are high quality long-term growth companies based or operating in Greater China. For the purposes of this investment objective, the countries of Greater China shall include China, Hong Kong and Taiwan.
    
    Contact
    Fondsgroep Comgest Asset Management Limited
    Telefoon +33 (0)1 44 94 19 00
    Adres Fifth Floor
    Fitzwilton House
    Wilton Place
    
    
12. [verwijderd] 25 maart 2005 12:41

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    Wordt dit draadje niet erg lang?
13. [verwijderd] 25 maart 2005 14:16

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    Zal ik een China, Economische Wondere Wereldmacht II, openen ?
    
    The Artist.
14. [verwijderd] 3 april 2005 20:03

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    Chinese economie valt te vergelijken met grote fabriek
    
    03 april 2005
    
    China bevindt zich momenteel in het jaar van de haan. Dat is doorgaans een onrustig jaar, vol verrassingen. Ook al hecht men niet zoveel geloof aan dergelijke voorspellingen, toch zou 2005 volgens ING wel degelijk voor verrassingen kunnen zorgen.
    
    Het teken van de aap (2004) en het teken van de bok (2003) brachten belangrijke evoluties in de liquiditeiten op de wereldmarkten.
    
    Schematisch heeft de Chinese economie zich in een reusachtige fabriek veranderd en spelen de Verenigde Staten de rol van supermarkt, waarvan de consumptie aangezwengeld wordt door de lage rente.
    
    
15. [verwijderd] 3 april 2005 20:03

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    Chinese economie blijft het goed doen
    
    03 april 2005
    
    Henderson Global Investors wijst er op dat de Chinese economie het goed blijft doen. Het BBP blijft aan een sterk tempo groeien en het inflatiegevaar is nog niet opgedoken.
    
    Voorlopig ziet Henderson Global Investors daarom nog geen noodzaak om de koers van reminbi (of yuan) te revalueren. De omstandigheden kunnen echter op relatief korte termijn wijzigen.
    
    Daarom valt het niet bij voorbaat uit te sluiten dat de Chinese overheid dit jaar nog beslist om de monetaire politiek aan te passen.
    
16. [verwijderd] 3 april 2005 20:04

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    Aanpassing Chinese monetaire politiek moeilijk te timen
    
    03 april 2005
    
    Een minder bruusk scenario voor de wereldeconomie en voor de financiële markten zou volgens ING een opwaardering van de yuan zijn. Een pariteitsverandering zou een afname van de stromen naar China impliceren.
    
    Tevens zou er sprake zijn van een gedeeltelijk herstel van het evenwicht van de lopende rekening van de betalingsbalans van de VS. Recente verklaringen van de Chinese overheid laten uitschijnen dat ze wijziging van hun wisselkoers niet uitsluiten.
    
    Die zal er echter volgens ING alleen komen als de tijd daar rijp voor is en zeker niet onder de druk van de Amerikanen. Hun beslissing zal vooral afhangen van de gevolgen voor de binnenlandse economie.
    
    
17. [verwijderd] 3 april 2005 20:05

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    Beleggers moeten leren leven met hogere olieprijzen
    
    03 april 2005
    
    In de olieprijs zit nog steeds een premie voor terreur verrekend, zonder dat helemaal duidelijk is hoe groot die premie eigenlijk wel is. Sommige analisten steken in dat verband een beschuldigende vinger uit naar de speculanten.
    
    Met name de hedge funds blijven erg actief op de oliemarkt. Toch speelt ook het spel van vraag en aanbod een belangrijke rol, want de consumptie van olie in Azië is fors gestegen.
    
    Over één ding zijn de analisten het eens: zowel de beleggers als de consumenten zullen moeten leren leven met hogere olieprijzen. Het lijkt onwaarschijnlijk dat de prijs aan de pomp nog sterk zal gaan dalen.
    
18. [verwijderd] 4 april 2005 03:23

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    1 ) voorgaande waren 4 kleine nederlandstalige tekstjes => leest simpel.
    
    2) ik heb er hier al op gehamerd dat we alleen de Hang Seng aandelen mogen volgen of de Hang Seng Index als referentie.
    
    Ik ben eens gaan kijken naar de Shanghai Composite, ten eerste verboden voor buitenlandse beleggers, maar ook 881 aandelen i.p.v. 33 voor de Hang Seng.
    
    het is dus duidelijk dat de Groten van China in de Hang Seng zitten de Gorilla's zij die de kleintjes van de Shanghai overnemen.
    
    Natuurlijk kunnen daar in de toekomst een paar interessante aandelen zitten, maar steek daar alvast niet te veel tijd in, laat de computer ze voor U screenen naar het profiel dat U wenst.
    
    Maar concentreer U maar beter op de Hang Seng.
    
    verder, zou men wel eens eerder dan verwacht nieuws uit de bus vallen i.v.m. de Chinese munt en de ontkoppeling.
    
    The Artist
19. [verwijderd] 4 april 2005 22:17

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    Lenovo deal marks new era
    
    Jean-Pierre Lehmann
    
    April 5, 2005
    
    
    Lenovo's move is a sign of evolving corporate strategies and a new division of labor in which successful global players adopt a more complementary approach. REUTERS
    
    The recent acquisition of a part of America's iconic IBM by a Chinese company, Lenovo, has been seen by many as a turning point a symbol of China's rise and America's decline. The significance of the event, however, lies elsewhere.
    
    The Chinese acquisition of IBM's faltering PC division represents a fundamental shift in the global IT industry, a new division of labor in which the successful players - the United States, China, and India - adopt a more complementary than confrontational approach. The rise of Lenovo in the international scene also helps to underline Japan and Europe's diminished role.
    
    From an historical perspective, this shift arose from a second major globalization push that began in the closing decades of last century. The first revolution occurred in the latter part of the 19th and early 20th centuries. Concentrated around transport and its associated technologies and resources, it witnessed the emergence of three new economic powers: the United States, Germany, and Japan. These nations challenged the economic leadership hitherto dominated by Great Britain.
    
    Of course, the driving technology of the globalization revolution in this century is IT. Most economic forecasts see the world economy in the next quarter-century being dominated by the US, China, and India, while Germany (and other European economies) and Japan decline. Microsoft and Dell of the US, Wipro and Infosys of India, and Lenovo and Huawei of China are the likely 21st century industrial giants comparable to 20th century global companies such as Rockefeller, Benz, and Mitsubishi.
    
    There is clearly a correlation between national economic power status and competitiveness at firm level in leading technological sectors.
    
    The US, home to half the world's R&D in information technology, retains the position of global IT business dynamo. In the knowledge economy, where intellectual power is of crucial importance, the US not only benefits, but indeed also glows, as the magnet of the global brain drain. This distinguishes the US from Europe, where immigration has been more at the brawn than at the brain level, and especially stands in starkest contrast with Japan, where neither foreign brain nor foreign brawn has been welcome.
    
    The US also has the most formidable corporate players across the IT spectrum, including Microsoft, IBM, Dell, Intel, and Motorola. Their American origins notwithstanding, all of these companies are highly globalized and engaged in strategic alliances with Asian partners both in hardware production and software development.
    
    In the global IT business, India definitely supplies the brains (the soft), having eschewed the brawn (the hard). Indian IT companies are investing in China to acquire production capabilities; Chinese firms are investing in India to acquire software. India is improving its hardware production, and China is attracting more investment in research. American companies are outsourcing much of their development work to India, while still focusing on manufacturing in China.
    
    Thus, Lenovo's acquisition of IBM's PC division can be seen in the light of the evolving corporate strategies. As American IT companies focus on systems, the more prosaic production business is being divested. The PC division lacked in profits, luster, and prospects thus the incentive for IBM to sell. For Lenovo, the deal culminates a 20-year history of honing its manufacturing prowess. With the acquisition of IBM PC, Lenovo aims to establish itself as a global computer firm by learning from IBM and utilizing its brand name.
    
    As the global IT revolution changes the world's landscape, Europe has virtually withdrawn, albeit with some robust presence still in communications notably the Finnish firm Nokia in mobile telephony. Japan has also suffered considerable decline, as the apparently dominant players of not that long ago, such as Hitachi, Toshiba, Fujitsu, Mitsubishi Electric, and even Sony, have increasingly appeared as rather hobbled giants.
    
    As Europe and Japan sink to the status of ``old economic powers'' in the 21st century, the US retains its lead among the ``new economic powers.''
    
    There are two key contrasting features that distinguish the US from Europe and Japan. One is the US adherence to the principles of creative destruction: companies are constantly in the process of reinventing themselves and casting off the old to embrace the new, as well as of jettisoning costly operations in order to embark on profitable new opportunities and moving up the technology value-added ladder. Of course there are failures, but the ``entrepreneurial'' spirit that foreigners so much admire and envy in the US derives not just from the myriad start-ups, but also from the frequent metamorphoses occurring in large American companies that leave their stuffy old German and Japanese counterparts in the dust. Operating in environments of stifling regulations and rigidities, they seem to be gasping for breath.
    
    Secondly, the United States derives tremendous benefits from the constant massive influx of immigrant brawn and immigrant brains.
    
    This offers obvious advantages in demographics and creativity. The US, unlike Europe and Japan, is not becoming a geriatric state.
    
    The tremendous role of foreigners, especially Asians, in the IT industry in America, in contrast to the much more national make-up of European and Japanese companies, is a great testimony to this fact.
    
    Japan's precipitate decline emerged due to the same two forces that have propelled the US. The first factor is encapsulated in remarks made by then prime minister Yasuhiro Nakasone. When Japan was at the height of economic power and glory, he attributed its success in good part to Japan's racial homogeneity.
    
    The second factor is that the Japanese do not embrace the notion of creative destruction. There are virtually no start-ups in Japan, and oftentimes large Japanese companies become immovable bureaucracies.
    
    In the days of ``hard-power,'' Japan's racial homogeneity and strict hierarchy were, arguably, advantages. Famed Japanese management techniques such as kanban benefit from strict discipline and from workers' ability to communicate easily. In this globalized, interdependent IT-revolutionary era, however, Japan's racial exclusivity and corporate bureaucratic hierarchic immobility are major obstacles.
    
    There is no God-or-man-written law that says that as new powers emerge, others must eclipse. Economics is not a zero-sum game. The rise of China and India and other countries should ideally revivify the older economic powers by providing new horizons, new challenges and new inspirations. Not only opening up to foreign talent, but indeed competing for it, is one prescription that Japan and Europe could fruitfully apply. Understanding the principles and implementing the practices of creative destruction is another constructive prescription.
    
    The recent announcement that Sony, beset by poor results, rigidities, and strategic drift, has turned to its first non-Japanese CEO a Welshman, Howard Stringer, and that he will be running the company from New York, may in time also symbolize a seismic shift in Japan's corporate cult
20. [verwijderd] 4 april 2005 22:23

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    corporate culture needed to revitalize its economy.
    
    With the much heralded Lisbon Strategy EU reforms created to inject new dynamism and growth into the regional economy European leaders might reflect on their past: during the age of exploration, success was driven by creativity, an enterprising global outlook, and ambitious leadership in boldly setting out for the unknown.
    
    Jean-Pierre Lehmann is Professor of International Political Economy at IMD, in Lausanne, Switzerland, and founding director of The Evian Group. Reprinted with permission from YaleGlobal Online (http://yaleglobal.yale.edu). 2005